The paper relaxes the one unit storage capacity imposed in the basic search-theoretic model of …at money with indivisible real commodities and indivisible money. Agents can accumulate as much money as they want. It characterizes the stationary distributions of money and shows that for reasonable parameter values (e.g. production cost, discounting, degree of specialization) a monetary equilibrium exists. There are multiple stationary distributions of a given amount of money, which di¤er in their levels of economic activity and welfare. The model reveals two essential features of money. First, the marginal expected utility of money decreases. Second, there exists an endogenous upper bound on the money holdings: agents willingly produce and sell for money up to this bound and refuse to do so if their money holdings exceed this bound.
Introduction
The paper extends the basic search-theoretic model of …at money with indivisible money and indivisible real commodities by considering a model in which agents can accumulate as much money as they want. There are two reasons for doing so. First, in the basic model developed by Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993) , agents have a one unit storage capacity, which does not allow them to hold more than one unit of money. Although this limitation seems to be unrealistic, the basic model is very useful to illustrate certain essential features of money and certain aspects of the exchange process without having to determine the distribution of money holdings. By removing this limitation, however, additional properties of money can be derived. It is shown that the marginal value of money decreases; the more money an agent owns, the smaller is the additional "insurance"against a lack of cash that additional money provides. Moreover, there exists an endogenous upper bound on the money holdings. Agents with money holdings below this bound willingly produce and sell for money while agents with money holdings above this bound cease production and selling.
Second, relaxing the one unit storage technology allows one to study distributional issues.
Without this constraint, there are multiple stationary distributions of a given quantity of money that di¤er in their levels of economic activity and welfare and, consequently, a redistribution of money a¤ects real economic variables.
Following the seminal work of Kiyotaki and Wright (1991,1993) , search models of …at money have undergone rapid development. A number of papers incorporated bilateral bargaining into their models to derive relative prices endogenously. Articles by Berentsen, Molico, and Wright (1998) , Trejos and Wright (1995), and Shi (1995) are the main examples. Other articles have addressed the limitation on the distribution of money imposed by restricting the inventories of individual agents. Two types of related research have beenundertaken to remove these restrictions. On the one hand, Molico (1998) and Molico and Musalem (1996) remove simultaneously all restrictions on the accumulation of goods and money. Their models have all the "desirable features"but they are di¢ cult to analyze analytically. The authors, therefore, use numerical methods to derive the bargaining solutions and to characterize the stationary distributions of goods and money.
On the other hand, other authors have studied less modi…ed versions of the basic model.
Articles by Corbae and Camera (1997) , Green and Zhou (1998a) , Li (1994) , Shi (1997), and Zhou (1998) are the main examples. Shi considers a model with divisible money and divisible commodities in which the traders bargain bilaterally about how much to trade.
Each household consists of many members who pool their money holdings each period, which eliminates aggregate uncertainty for households because the distribution of money is degenerate across households. In the symmetric equilibrium all households hold the same amount of money and, consequently, all commodities are exchanged at the same price.
Zhou and Green and Zhou investigate a model where agents can hold any arbitrary amount of divisible money and bargain bilaterally about the amount of money that is exchanged for one unit of an indivisible commodity. Their focus is on the existence of a monetary equilibrium when all commodities are traded at the same price. In Green and Zhou's model the agents obtain their production good at no cost. In Zhou's model production is costly, which gives rise to an endogenous bound on money holdings. In both models, money holdings are private information and when a buyer meets a seller, the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it-o¤er to the buyer (seller-posting-price protocol). Green and Zhou and Zhou conjecture a pattern of exchange in which all trades take place at one price and then provide conditions under which such an equilibrium exists.
Corbae and Camera study a model with indivisible money where agents can accumulate 3 money up to an exogenous bound. When a buyer and a seller meet, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it-o¤er about the quantity of the divisible consumption commodity to be exchanged for one unit of money. When the buyers make their o¤ers they know the money holdings of the sellers. Similar to the articles of Green and Zhou and Zhou, Corbae and Camera conjecture a uniform pattern of exchange, and then provide conditions under which such an equilibrium exists.
Li studies the accumulation of commodity inventories in search equilibrium. In his model no agent can accumulate money and money and real commodities must be exchanged one for one. He …nds that search e¤orts and inventory accumulation are too low relative to the social optimum and shows that an in ‡ation tax can improve aggregate welfare.
In the …rst part of the paper the equilibrium behavior of the agents and the stationary distributions of money holdings are derived. Then, it is shown that for reasonable parameter values (e.g. production cost, discounting, degree of specialization) a monetary equilibrium exists. Finally, the existence of multiple stationary distributions of a given quantity of money is discussed.
The model
The economy consists of J > 2 distinct nonstorable commodities. The commodities are indivisible and come in units of size one. They are produced and consumed by a large number of in…nitely lived agents who di¤er in their tastes for and in their ability to produce these commodities. Each agent has one favorite commodity, which is called his consumption good. Consuming one unit yields utility U > 0. Consuming one of the other commodities yields zero utility. No agent can produce his own consumption commodity; nevertheless, each agent has the ability to produce one of the other J commodities at cost C, U > C > 0.
Particularly, an agent of type s produces commodity s and consumes commodity s + 1 (mod J). Accordingly, the number of types is J.
1 In addition to the consumption goods, there is also an object called …at money. Fiat money comes in indivisible units of size one, is storable, and cannot be consumed by any agent. Agents can accumulate and hold as much money as they want.
All agents have to trade to get their consumption good. For this purpose they search for trading partners. Time is discrete and in each period each agent meets one other agent. The order of events in a match is as follows: 1) the traders decide whether to trade and what to trade; 2) the production takes place and the objects change hand; 3) the traders separate and the traded commodities are consumed; 4) when the agents trade real commodities for money they always exchange one unit of a real commodity for one unit of money.
2
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents with mass 1, the measure of agents of each type is equal, and all agents in each period are randomly matched into pairs with equal probability. This symmetry implies that the agents meet other agents of a particular type with equal probability q = J 1 . Thus, q is the probability of meeting a producer of one's consumption commodity and of meeting an agent eager to get one's product. Denote by m i (t) the measure of agents with money holdings i, at time t. In the steady state equilibrium, m i (t) = m i . Denote further by m a set of measures m i , i = 0; ::; 1, satisfying P 1 i=0 m i = 1, by p b the probability that an agent can buy his consumption commodity, and by p s the probability that he can sell his product before he is matched. He can buy his consumption commodity if his partner can produce this good and if the partner is willing to do so for money. He can sell for money if his trading partner is a consumer of his production commodity and has money. Denote the expected utility (value function) of an 5 agent with money holdings i by V i . Then, if is the discount factor, the value functions
For example, with probability p s an agent with no money meets an individual willing to buy his product. The agent proposes (accepts) to sell his product if V According to the …rst part of De…nition 1, the monetary equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium for a given set of measures m. The second part requires that the economy is in a steady state given the selling and buying activities induced by (1). The third part requires that money has value.
3
Lemma 1 In a monetary equilibrium the value functions satisfy
According to a), in a monetary equilibrium the expected lifetime utility is never smaller than the expected utility in the nonmonetary equilibrium and it is strictly smaller than 6 Proof: Denote by V the expected utility of an agent that never reaches state i = 0, and note that
This implies that there exists a n such that
In a monetary equilibrium agents are willing to produce and sell for money if i < n and refuse to do so if i n. This behavior is summarized in Figure 2 where the horizontal axis displays the money holdings i and the vertical axis the marginal value of money
. Note also that Proposition 1 determines the probabilities of selling and buying. They are p s = q (1 m 0 ) and p b = q (1 m n ), respectively.
Corollary 1 In a monetary equilibrium, the measures m satisfy
> 0, i = 0; :::; n, and
If m 0 S m n ; then m i S m i+1 ; i = 0; :::; n 1:
Proof: Consider, …rst, the second part of (2). Assume that, to the contrary of Corollary 1, m i > 0 for some i > n. According to Proposition 1, agents with money holdings i > n do not produce and sell. However, they are willing to spend money. Hence,
is not stationary. Consider, next, the …rst part of (2). In a steady state, the measure of agents who leave state i equals the measure of agents that enter this state. All steady state conditions are summarized in the following n + 1 equations:
One of the equations is redundant and the remaining equations simplify to p b m i = p s m i 1 , i = 1; ::; n, and (6)
8 Solving (7) recursively yields the …rst part of (2). Combine (2) 
Existence
For any set of measures m a monetary equilibrium exists if m satis…es (2) and (3) and if no agent has an incentive to either increase his money holdings above n or to refuse to sell for money when i < n. Thus, a stationary distribution is a …xed point of the mapping
Because (2) and (3) are necessary conditions it is su¢ cient to study the set D 1 = fm : m satis…es (2) and (3)g and the mapping f :
To proceed denote by C the value of C that solves C 1 = V n (m) V n 1 (m) and bỹ C the value of C that solves
Proposition 2 For any m 2 D 1 there exist critical values C andC constructed in the proof, with C >C > 0, such that the following is true: if C C >C, m is stationary, and if C > C or ifC C, m is not stationary.
Proof: By construction of C andC, if C C >C, agents with money holdings n 1 are willing to produce for money whereas agents with money holdings n are not willing to do so.
Then, the concavity property d) of Lemma 1 implies that all agents with money holdings i < n are willing to produce for money and all agents with money holdings i n are not willing to do so. Finally, m satis…es (2) and (3). This establishes that m is stationary if C C >C. If C > C, agents with money holding n 1 are not willing to produce for money and ifC C, they increase their money holdings above n and m is not stationary.
To derive C andC, rewrite (1) to get 
where 0 < 1 < 1 and 2 > 1 are the two distinct real roots
are the coe¢ cients, and =
is the particular integral. Use (9) to get
To deriveC use
Then, use (12) and (9) to get
(12) implies that C >C. To see thatC > 0, note that the numerator and the denominator of (13) are positive because
Proposition 3 For any bound n, a monetary equilibrium exists if
Proof: First, note that for any m 2 D 1 the quantity of money is M = P n i=0 im i where 
Finally, note that C (M ) is continuous in (0; n). This and the two limit points imply that if C < U 
Discussion
The paper relaxes the one unit storage technology imposed in the search theoretic models of …at money developed by Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993 The equilibria di¤er in their levels of economic activity and welfare and, consequently, a redistribution of money a¤ects real economic variables.
While the paper investigates in detail the exchange process, it does not explore the determination of exchange rates. One way to derive relative prices is to let the traders bargain about the quantity of a real commodity that changes hands for one nondivisible unit of money. This extension would result in price dispersion because the bargaining solutions would depend on the money holdings of the bargainers. An other extension would be to consider nonstationary distributions and the convergence property of the model. See, for example, Green and Zhou (1998b) who consider the convergence property in a related model when there are no constraints on money holdings and traders are assumed to have overtaking-criterion preferences rather than discounting or Berentsen (1998) who studies the convergence property of the model for a given upper bound on money holdings.
